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THE COURT OF APPEALS 1952-53 TERM
referee's report was not binding, but merely "to inform the conscience of the court."'
Home Rule
The New York Constitution expressly prohibits the Legislature from passing any law in relation to the "property, affairs or
government" of cities, except by general law which in terms and
effect apply alike to all cities or by special request of the particular
city.3 7 The purpose of these so-called home rule provisions is to
prevent special pork-barrel legislation and undue rural influence in
respect to cities.38 As to just what acts constitute such infringement upon the "property, affairs or government" of cities has
been a constant source of litigation. Adler v. Deegan?9 is the leading case in New York, stating that "property, affairs or government" are words of art, defined not by the common meaning of
the words, but as defined by the Court of Appeals. In 1953 the
Legislature authorized New York City to turn over its transit
facilities to the New York City Transit Authority if the city would
comply with certain conditions.40 Favorable tax provisions would
thereby accrue to New York City. A taxpayer's action was
brought in Salzma%v. Impellitteri4' to enjoin the city from this
legislatively authorized transaction and a declaratory judgment
was sought as to the constitutionality of the transaction. The Court
of Appeals held, per curiam, that "the statutes in question are
permissive only,42 in a field in which the State is concerned 3 . . .
and assuming that any transfer will not be by absolute conveyance,
but by a lease of limited term with reversion to the city,44 we cannot say that the legislation is on its face unconstitutional." Judge
Dye dissented on the ground that New York City's straightened
tax structure made any choice purely illusory, that the legislation
deals solely with a proprietory interest of New York City and is
thus in violation of the constitutional home-rule provisions.
36. The instant case citing Bannon v. Bannon, 270 N. Y. 484, 493, 1 N. E. 2d
975, 979 (1936).
37. NEw Yorx CoNsT. Art. IX, § 11.
38. 1 MCQUILLAN, MuNIciPA. CoRpoATrio_ § 1.93 (3d ed. 1949); FoRDHAm,
LocAL GovmRNMEN LAW 74-79 (Ist ed. 1949).
39. 251 N. Y. 467, 167 N. E. 705 (1929).
40. L. 1953, cc. 200-208.
41. 305 N. Y. 414, 113 N. E. 2d 543 (1953).
42. For analogous case of permissive federal legislation not impinging upon state
sovereignty see Massachusetts v. Mcllon, 262 U. S. 447 (199.-).
43.' Matter of McAneny v. Board of Estimate, 232 N. Y. 377, 134 N. E. 187 (1922)
held that the New York City transportation system was a matter of state concern and
the legislature may therefore act under the police power.
44. N. Y. Const. Art. VIII, § 1 prohibits a city from giving or loaning its credit
to a public or private corporation. The transit authority would be a public corperation.
GEN. Coin. LAW §§ 2, 3. Deady v. Lyons, 39 App. Div. 139, 57 N. Y. Supp. 448 (4th
Dep't 1899) held that a village could not give funds for repair of a county courthouse
because this would be a gift to a public corporation.

